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GULF WAR SYNDROME-IS LITIGATION
THE ANSWER?: LEARNING LESSONS
FROM IN RE AGENT ORANGE
The return of American troops from Operation Desert Storm in
1991 generated a sense of unity and success1 which was markedly
different from the atmosphere that characterized the nation at the
end of the Vietnam conflict.2 A comparison of the two military ef-
forts, however, reveals one unfortunate commonality: Persian
Gulf veterans are exhibiting a variety of medical symptoms, with
effects ranging from benign to deadly,3 just as Vietnam veterans
did after their return to the United States.4
There appears to be a wealth of explanations for the symptoms
afflicting those who served in Operation Desert Shield and Desert
Storm.5 Former Senator Donald W. Riegle Jr. singled out the use
1 See David Brown, Triumphant in Desert, Stricken at Home, WASH. POST, July 24, 1994,
at Al (characterizing Persian Gulf War as "more successful and more safe-at least for
Americans-than anybody could have imagined," and noting that fewer American soldiers
died in battle than in road accidents); see also Denis Wadley, With a Penstroke, Put the
Selective Service Out of Our Misery, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 1993, at A15 (quot-
ing Selective Service Director Robert Gambino who characterized performance of American
troops in Operation Desert Storm as "stunning").
2 See generally CLARK DOUGAN & STEPHEN WEISS, THE AMiucAN EXPERIENCE IN VIET-
NAM 334-35 (1988). Vietnam veterans had little time for readjustment after the conflict and
returned to a nation increasingly uncomfortable with their presence. Id. They soon realized
that both ends of the political spectrum had abandoned them. Id.
3 See infra note 99 and accompanying text (listing symptoms exhibited by Gulf War vet-
erans); see also Norm Brewer & John Hanchett, Are Gulf War Veterans Getting Needed
Treatment?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Dec. 21, 1994.
4 DouGAN & WEISS, supra note 2, at 334-35. In addition to acute physical disabilities
from combat, Vietnam veterans returned with "a collection of infirmities" including chronic
skin rashes, respiratory problems, impaired hearing and vision, violent headaches, loss of
sex drive and cancer, all of which were subsequently attributed to exposure to Agent Or-
ange. Id.
5 See David Brown, The Search for Causes, WASH. POST, July 24, 1994, at A19. Among
the explanations for the symptoms suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm, medi-
cal professionals point to exposure to chemical weapons, organic chemicals, smoke from oil
well fires, pyridostigmine (a drug designed to protect against chemical weapons exposure),
desert sand, psychological stress, multiple chemical sensitivity and psychological conta-
gion. Id.; see also Alison Delsite, Persian Gulf Illnesses Blamed On Desert Sand, TmmEs-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 7, 1994, at A2. Sixty of 582 members of the 193rd Special
Operations Group of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard who served in Desert Shield or
Desert Storm all suffered from similar symptoms, including chronic diarrhea, irritable
bowel syndrome, stomach bloating, night sweats, and skin lesions, which doctors deemed to
be a result of their exposure to desert sand. Id. In concluding that the sand directly caused
the illnesses, doctors noted that the veterans developed skin lesions and pustules only on
those areas which had been exposed to the desert sand. Id. Other doctors speculated that
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of chemical and biological weapons as a predominant factor.7 A
group of Desert Storm veterans who echoed Senator Riegle's con-
cern filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.8 In their complaint, the plaintiffs attempted to
link American and foreign companies to the production of such
weapons.9 The filing of this lawsuit, which is presently in its pre-
ambient sand particles altered the veterans' immune systems by lodging in their lungs,
thereby increasing their susceptibility to respiratory illness. Brown, supra, at A19. Sand
was also linked to non-respiratory illnesses such as viscerotropic leishmaniasis, an infec-
tion caused by a parasite which is known to be carried by sand flies. Id. Doctors have found
that the parasites found in the sand flies eject poison, which can kill the host by destroying
its immune and nervous systems. George C. Wilson, Curing What Ails Him and Other Gulf
War Vets, ARMY TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1994. Congress noted some of the possible causes of Desert
Storm Syndrome in § 102 of the Persian Gulf War Veterans' Benefits Act. § 102, 108 Stat.
4645, 4647 (1994):
During the Persian Gulf War, members of the Armed Forces were exposed to numer-
ous potentially toxic substances, including fumes and smoke from military operations,
oil well fires, diesel exhaust, paints, pesticides, depleted uranium, infectious agents,
investigational drugs and vaccines, and indigenous diseases, and were also given mul-
tiple immunizations. It is not known whether these service members were exposed to
chemical or biological warfare agents. However, threats of enemy use of chemical and
biological warfare heightened the psychological stress associated with the military
operation.
Id. § 102(1).
See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992 609
(1991). Former Senator Riegle (D-MI) was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. Id. He declined to seek re-election 1994. Id.; 140 CONG. REC.
S1196-201 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Sen. Riegle). The Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee has oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act,
which enabled it to obtain information on the export of biological materials from the United
States to Iraq prior the Gulf War. Id.
7 SEE 140 CONG. REC. 51196-201 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
While addressing the Senate, Senator Riegle alleged that United States troops may have
come in contact with chemical and biological weapons, "either through direct exposure from
some kind of weapon, or shell fire; or from the downwind exposure as we bombed these
biological and chemical weapons facilities-throwing hazardous debris up into the air
which was then carried down over our troops." Id. Congress initially collected data concern-
ing chemical weapons use in the Persian Gulf and then proceeded to amass data on possi-
ble biological weapons exposure. Id. But see David Brown, No Evidence Chemical Weapons
Used in Gulf War, Panel Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A6. A panel appointed by the
National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine reported that there was "no evidence
that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf War, and that rumors
they were should be put to rest." Id. The panel further concluded that Gulf War syndrome
was 'not the result of chemical, biological, or toxin warfare, or accidental exposures to
stored weapons or research material." Id.; Pentagon Rejects Germ War Agents for Gulf Ills,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1995, at 19 (citing Pentagon's rejection of theory that chemical
and biological weapons caused Gulf War syndrome).
8 Coleman v. Abb Lummus Crest, Inc., No. G-94-415 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30, 1994); see
Ohioans With Gulf War Syndrome Join Product Liability Case, BEACON J. (Akron), Feb. 27,
1995, at C4 (reporting that approximately 2000 veterans have joined lawsuit).
9 Terri Langford, Ill Gulf War Veterans Sue 11 Companies, PHILA. INQ., June 8, 1994, at
A5. The veterans named eleven American companies in their complaint, stating that the
companies made "unreasonably dangerous" biological compounds and conducted their oper-
ations so as to allow "an outlaw country like Iraq" an opportunity to acquire these com-
pounds and use them to make weapons. Id. The complaint also alleged that the companies
were negligent in selling bacteria and micro-organisms to Iraq prior to the war and that
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trial stage, represents the veterans' dissatisfaction with the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs' response to their medical needs.' 0
Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs have begun to
address Gulf War Syndrome more effectively by authorizing medi-
cal care and disability payments for affected veterans." The needs
of Gulf War veterans' children, however, many of whom were born
with birth defects,' 2 as well as wives, suffering from stillbirths
and miscarriages,'" have not been addressed.' 4
The inception of litigation stemming from Gulf War Syndrome
commands a comparison to the In re Agent Orange Product Liabil-
ity Litig.'5 and its settlement following the Vietnam Conflict.' 6 In
re Agent Orange elucidated the proof and causation obstacles in-
Iraq used these materials against the United States and its allies during the Persian Gulf
War. John Toth, Ill Veterans File Lawsuit Over Gulf War Syndrome, Hous. CHRON., June 8,
1994, at A22; see also 140 CONG. Rc. S1196-201 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Riegle). The Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee conducted research to
determine what, if any, biological materials had been shipped to Iraq and found that, since
1985, the United States Department of Commerce had authorized shipments to Iraq of
pathogenic and toxigenic materials which were capable of being reproduced by the Iraqis
and transformed into biological weapons. Id. at S1196-97.
10 See 140 CONG. REC. S3098-01 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994) (statement of Sen. Shelby).
Senator Shelby, in addressing the Senate, stated that veterans were dissatisfied with the
Department of Veterans Affairs' and the Department of Defense's initial responses to the
veterans' health needs. Id.
11 See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text (tracing congressional steps to aid Gulf
War veterans); see also Disability Pay for Gulf War Veterans, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4, 1995,
at Al1. The Department of Veterans Affairs will pay benefits to Gulf War veterans found to
have had symptoms of Gulf War syndrome for at least six months. Id. Benefits will range
from $89 a month for 10% disability to $1,823 for 100% disability. Id.
12 See Richard A. Serrano, Birth Defects in Gulf Vets' Babies Stir Fear, Debate, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at Al (reporting that "Gulf War babies" have died of heart defects
and liver cancer).
13 See Daniel Roth, Gulf War Syndrome Destroying Families, Children, States News
Serv., Aug. 5, 1994, at Al (describing wives' problems with child birth, including miscar-
riages and still births).
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting illnesses suffered by children of vet-
erans). But see Despite Fears, Evidence Shows Babies of Veterans of Gulf War Born
Healthy, STAR TRhi. (Minneapolis), Jan. 19, 1995, at A12. "New evidence from military hos-
pitals and studies of veterans shows that the infant mortality rate for the children of
soldiers did not change after the Gulf War and remains better than the national average."
Id.
16 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving settlement between class of Vietnam
veterans and their families and manufacturers of Agent Orange), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
16 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ap-
proving settlement between Vietnam veterans and chemical companies).
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herent in tort litigation,' 7 leading many experts to conclude that
those burdens can become insurmountable in mass toxic cases.',
Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York noted the difficulties in estab-
lishing the causal connection between exposure to dioxin, a key
component of Agent Orange, and the injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs. 19 As a result, he urged the veterans and their families
to accept a settlement, citing potential proof and causation obsta-
cles likely to arise at trial.2" Judge Weinstein cautioned the plain-
tiffs that if they failed to prove the required tort elements, he
would be forced to grant a directed verdict for the defendants. 2 '
The plaintiffs in In re Agent Orange had effectively traced their
illnesses to the contaminant dioxin.22 Gulf War Veterans, compar-
atively, have been unable to identify a singular causal agent.23
More importantly, a growing segment of the medical community
questions whether the syndrome actually exists. 24 Based on this
reasoning, it seems that Gulf War Veterans will be even less likely
to surmount the proof and causation hurdles imposed by the tort
system.
Part One of this Note will analyze the legislative response to
Gulf War Syndrome. Part Two will discuss governmental immu-
nity in the military setting according to the doctrine enunciated by
the Supreme Court in the 1950 case Feres v. United States,25 and
17 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (dismissing claims of veterans who had declined to join class action because of lack of
evidence of causal link between exposure to Agent Orange and symptoms).
18 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (detailing causation requirement in tort
cases).
19 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1260 (stating proof of causal connection was only
"remotely possible").
20 See Rabin infra note 57, at 816 (explaining Judge Weinstein's commitment to settle
case because of proof and causation problems).
21 See Rabin infra note 57, at 816 (illustrating Judge Weinstein's concern with viability
of plaintiff's case were it to proceed to trial).
22 See ALIviN L. YOUNG & Gwuuo M. REGGiANI, AGENT ORANGE AND ITS ASSOCIATED Di-
oxiN: AN ASSESSMENT OF A CONTROVERSY 10 (1988).
?3 See David Brown, "Gulf War" Illness Vexes Doctors; Tests of 1,000 Soldiers Turn Up
No One Cause, INT'L HERALD Tam., Dec. 15, 1994, at A22. Stephen Joseph, the assistant
secretary of defense for health affairs, claimed that studies of 1,000 soldiers claiming to be
afflicted with Gulf War syndrome show that there are multiple causes for the syndrome. Id.
24 See, e.g., British Find No Evidence of Gulf War Syndrome, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1995,
at A. After a study of 77 British veterans of the Persian Gulf War, British Armed Forces
Minister Nicholas Soames concluded that "scientific and clinical data provide no evidence
for the existence of Gulf War syndrome among ailing veterans." Id.
25 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that serviceman is precluded from recovering judg-
ment against United States for service related injuries).
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in the 1977 case, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States26
which effectively eliminates government tort liability for service
connected injuries. Part Three will trace the history of the Agent
Orange litigation from its inception to its settlement in 1983. Part
Four will compare the current Gulf War Syndrome litigation to In
re Agent Orange, acknowledging the inadequacies of the tort sys-
tem. Part Five will examine alternative compensation systems.
Finally, this Note will recommend that Gulf War veterans seek
redress by encouraging a more comprehensive legislative response
to their illnesses instead of relying on the judicial process.
I. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO GULF WAR SYNDROME
It took many years for veterans of the Vietnam conflict to com-
pel a congressional response to the problems caused by Agent Or-
ange. In contrast, Persian Gulf veterans have had many of their
needs addressed in a more timely manner.2" The earliest legisla-
tive action dealing with what is now known as "Gulf War Syn-
drome" reveals a concern that exposure to oil well fires may be the
root of the troops' illnesses.29
Congress augmented aid to Gulf War veterans in 1991 by au-
thorizing the creation of a registry under the auspices of the Sec-
retary of Defense to catalog all members of the Armed Forces who
had been exposed to oil well fire fumes.3 0 This registry was
26 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977) (barring indemnification actions against United States by
government contractors where injured party is member of Armed Forces).
27 See Agent Orange Act of 1991, 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (Supp. V 1993) (creating presumption
of military service in Vietnam as connection for presence of certain diseases in Vietnam
veterans which are associated with exposure to certain herbicides); see also PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, 78-79 (1986) (tracing publicity surrounding Agent Or-
ange in the late seventies and early eighties). Congress unanimously passed legislation in
1981 which gave veterans claiming Agent Orange-related illnesses higher priority in ob-
taining access to care in Veterans Administration Hospitals and nursing homes than other
veterans. Id. Professor Schuck claims this act "sidestepped the dispute over the health ef-
fects of Agent Orange" by providing care for exposed veterans while stipulating that there
was insufficient medical evidence to conclude their illnesses were related to Agent Orange
exposure. Id.
28 See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text (tracing congressional response to Gulf
War syndrome).
29 See infra note 30 and accompanying text (detailing congressional action regarding
studies of oil well fire fumes).
30 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 § 734, 10
U.S.C. § 1074 (Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing establishment of registry by Secretary of De-
fense of members of Armed Forces who were exposed to burning oil fumes during Operation
Desert Storm). The Act also provides for members listed in the registry to receive, upon
request, "a pulmonary function examination and chest x-ray" if such testing was deemed
medically appropriate. Id. The Secretary of Defense must submit annually to Congress a
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designed to provide assistance to aggrieved veterans.3 Similarly,
the Veterans Health Care Act of 199232 expands the Department
of Defense Registry and creates a Veterans Affairs Registry.13
Scientific experts have subsequently discredited the oil well fire
link to Gulf War Syndrome.3 4 The studies authorized under the
Act, however, continue to explore other possible causes for the vet-
erans' symptoms.3 5 As part of the exploration, Congress's next leg-
islative step was to authorize scientific studies to explore whether
report analyzing the results gathered through the registry and determining whether Con-
gress should authorize new studies on troop exposure to burning oil fumes. Id. §§ 734(c)(1),
(2).
31 Id. § 702(f). Members of the V.A. Registry were to receive periodic notices from the
V.A. "of significant developments in research on the health consequences of military service
in the Persian Gulf theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War." Id. The act also
provided for medical examinations, consultations and counseling to be given to all members
of the V.A. registry. Id. § 703(b)(1). Veterans who were eligible for other health-related
registry compiled by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may be given the above listed serv-
ices at the Secretary's discretion. Id. § 703(b)(2).32 See Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 § 704, 38 U.S.C. § 527 (Supp. V 1993). The Act
expanded the registry to include the names of any members of the Armed Forces who
'served in the Operation Desert Storm theater of operations during the Persian Gulf con-
flict," regardless of exposure to burning oil fumes. Id.
33 Id. § 702(a). To be included in the registry, the veteran must have:
(A) applie[d] for care or services from the Department of Veterans Affairs...
(B) file[d] a claim for compensation ... on the basis of any disability which may be
associated with such service;
(C) die[d] and is survived by a spouse, child, or parent who files a claim for dependency
and indemnity compensation . . . on the basis of such service;
(D) request[ed] from the Department a health examination... or
(E) receive[d] from the Department of Defense a health examination similar to the
health examination referred to in subparagraph (D) and requests inclusion in the
Registry.
Id. §§ 702(b)(1)(A)-(E).
34 See No Kuwait Oil Fire Link Found to GI Ills, CHI. TRm., Sept. 17, 1992, at 6 (citing
government report that found no link between oil fire exposure and ailments suffered by
American troops); see also Jacqueline Frank, Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses to be Studied,
REUTERS, Sept. 16, 1992 (reporting Pentagon and Veterans Affairs officials statement that
"no conclusive proof that Kuwaiti oil fires or other toxic substances caused illness in Per-
sian Gulf War troops"). But see Sarah Tippit, What's Wrong With Our Gulf War Veterans?
Several Studies, Several Possible Causes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 1995, at 9 (citing
argument that source of veterans' illnesses may be exposure to environmental toxins such
as smoke from burning oil wells, paint, and leaded diesel fuel).
35 See Dept. of Veterans Affairs 'Descriptive Epidemiology of Illness Patterns Among
Veterans of the Persian Gulf Conflict", Mark R. Cullen, M.D., principal investigator; see
also Dept. of Veterans Affairs 'Respiratory Effects of Ambient Air Pollution Among Veter-
ans of the Persian Gulf Conflict.", John P. Concato, M.D., principal investigator; Bethany
Candell, "Gulf War Syndrome" Explained, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1992, at 2A. Most veterans
'believe their problems come from something they encountered in the gulf, like exposure to
petrochemicals during the Kuwaiti oil fires or diesel fuel in shower water." Id. But see
Philip J. Hilts, Study on Ailing Gulf War G.I. 's Called a Failure, N.Y. TImsS, Jan. 5, 1995,
at A10. A panel affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences concluded that research
on the health problems of Persian Gulf War veterans had been poorly organized and had
failed to determine if Gulf War syndrome really exists. Id. But see Thomas D. Williams,
Investigator Says Panel Ignored Iraqi Links to Gulf War Ailments, HARTFORD COURAr,
Feb. 8, 1995, at A5 (stating congressional investigator found oversight committee of eight-
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exposure to hazardous agents or depleted uranium caused Gulf
War Syndrome. 6 Troops may also have been exposed to depleted
uranium by "friendly fire" from United States tanks, which used
ammunition powered in part by depleted uranium.37
Recognizing that the Department of Veterans Affairs could not
legitimately address the needs of the ailing Gulf War veterans
under the existing statutory framework,3 8 Congress passed legis-
lation in late 1993 designed to increase Gulf War veterans' access
to the Department's facilities. 39 Time constraints imposed by this
legislation, however, only allowed these increased services to Gulf
War veterans through December 31, 1994.40 Congress addressed
this limitation by enacting the National Defense Authorization
een doctors and professors ignored evidence that sicknesses afflicting many Persian Gulf
War veterans can be traced to Iraqi chemical and biological weapons).
36 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, §§ 270-
271, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993). The term "hazardous agents" includes chemical warfare agents,
biotoxins and any other toxic substances to which members of the Armed Forces in the Gulf
War may have been exposed. Id. § 270(a)(2). This act allocated $1.2 million to the Depart-
ment of Defense for the creation of an environmental facility suited to the investigation of
health effects on humans, especially active duty Gulf War veterans, of low level exposure to
hazardous chemicals. Id. § 270(b). The act allocated an additional $1.7 million for research
into health effects of exposure to depleted uranium on the battlefield. Id. § 271(a); cf Scien-
tists Fault Federal Gulf War Illness Effort, COMMERCLAL APPEAL (Memphis), Jan. 5, 1995, at
5A (noting National Academy of Sciences panel concluded government's research on health
problems of Persian Gulf War veterans has been badly organized and has failed to deter-
mine if Gulf War syndrome exists).
37 See Patrick Cockburn, U.S. Troops Claim Gulf "Disease", ThE INDEPENDENT (London),
June 10, 1993, at 14. The author reported that Major-General Ronald R. Blanck, command-
ing officer at the Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, claimed that 22 United States soldiers
showed no symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome, despite having been wounded when their
vehicles were mistakenly fired upon with depleted uranium shells. Id. Major-General
Blanck also acknowledged, however, that the veterans' illnesses are "real," and added that
"[slo far, we are unable to relate it conclusively to environmental exposure". . . unfortu-
nately, "we [the military] don't know [the causes]." Id.; see also, Marlene Cimons, Gulf War
Syndrome May Be Contagious, L.A. TmEs, Oct. 21, 1994, at A4 (reporting that depleted
uranium was used in munitions and armor).
38 See generally 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1988). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is authorized
to furnish hospital care to veterans who have "service-connected" disabilities. Id. Jesse
Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, reported to Congress that the current law allows the
Department of Veterans Affairs to grant the designation "service connection" only to cases
in which there has been a diagnosis of the underlying illness; 140 CONG. REC. H7082-107,
H7084 (Aug. 8, 1994). Because scientists have been unable to diagnose the illnesses associ-
ated with Gulf War Syndrome, the Department of Veterans Administration was not able to
favorably consider claims for treatment by sick veterans. Id.
39 See 38 U.S.C. § 1710 (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing hospital and nursing care for Gulf
War veterans).
40 38 U.S.C. § 1710(e)(3) (extending hospital care, nursing home care, and medical serv-
ices for Gulf War veterans only to December 31, 1994).
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Act for Fiscal Year 1995,41 which provided varying degrees of
medical care for different classes of Gulf War veterans.42
Recently, Congress took its most significant legislative action41
by enacting the Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994 (the
"Act").44 The Act gives the Secretary of Veterans Affairs authority,
on a presumptive basis, to compensate veterans who suffer "from
a chronic disability resulting from an undiagnosed illness" 45 that
manifested itself during or after service in the war.46 Additionally,
in response to reports that Gulf War Syndrome also was adversely
affecting the spouses and children of veterans,4 7 the Act provides
funds48 for a study to evaluate the health status of these two
41 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 721,
108 Stat. 2663 (1994).
42 Id. The medical benefits provided for by the act are provided as an incentive for, and
contingent upon, registration in one of the Department of Defense's or Veterans Adminis-
tration's registries. Id. § 721(b). Active duty veterans of the Persian Gulf War are provided
'a full medical evaluation and any required medical care." Id. § 721(b)(1). Members of a
reserve component are entitled to "a full medical evaluation" by the Defense Department,
however medical care will be administered at the Defense Department's discretion. Id.
§ 721(b)(2). Veterans who are neither active nor in a reserve unit are entitled only to "sup-
port services provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs". Id. § 721(bX3). The Act cre-
ates a statutory presumption that the aggrieved veteran's illness is a result of serving in
the Persian Gulf War. Id. § 721(dX2). This presumption exists "until such time as the
weight of medical evidence establishes another cause or causes of the member's illness." Id.
43 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. H7082-107 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994) (statement of Rep. Mont-
gomery). Representative Montgomery stated that "[wihat we are doing is unprecedented"
in the history of the United States. Id. at H7084; see also Bill McAllister, Illness Pay for
Gulf Vets Is Endorsed; Administration Plan Would Not Require A Defined Ailment, WASH.
POST, June 10, 1994, at Al. Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown declared that the
legislation was "revolutionary" and "unprecedented" because, previously, the Department
of Veterans Affairs had only been authorized to compensate for "illnesses or conditions that
[could] be directly linked to their active duty service." Id. But see Jim Schnabel, Band-
Wagon Syndrome, WASH. PosT, June 29, 1994, at A23. Schnabel warned, prior to the bill's
enactment, that "to validate a nonexistent syndrome by legislative fiat, as the administra-
tion and its congressional allies may do here, could also lead to a flood of spurious claims,
drawing funds from taxpayers and other veterans' programs and causing needless anxie-
ties among veterans and their families." Id. Schnabel points to the fact that when the V.A.
created its registry for Gulf War Syndrome veterans, the number of claimants rose from
300 to 24,000, in order to support his claim that "mass illness can be created more easily by
suggestion and incentive than by any biological agent." Id.
44 Persian Gulf War Veterans' Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, 108 Stat. 4645, 4647
(1994).
45 Id. § 106(a).
46 Id. § 106(a)(1),(2). The act authorizes the creation of a presumptive period of time,
within which any illnesses manifested after service in the Gulf War are presumed to be
connected to the veteran's service in the Gulf War. Id. § 106(b).
47 See Gulf War Illness May Be Spreading To Veterans' Families, ARIz. RP., Mar. 6,
1994, at A10 (reporting that 37 of 55 babies born after Gulf War to members of four Missis-
sippi National Guard units that served in war were suffering from illnesses, including re-
spiratory and blood disorders); see also Cimons, supra note 37, at A4. (stating that of 400
veterans polled, 78% of their spouses and 25% of their children born before Gulf War were
also being affected by Gulf War syndrome).
48 Gulf War Benefits Act § 107(c).
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groups. 49 In order to ensure that veterans would utilize the newly
authorized programs, the Act mandates an aggressive outreach
program.50
Despite these congressional measures, the Gulf War litigation
in Texas indicates a dissatisfaction with legislative relief.51 The
broad range of lucrative tort remedies, including pain and suffer-
ing as well as punitive damages, makes the possibility of a civil
judgment appealing to veterans.5 2 The complexity and magnitude
of mass toxics litigation suggests that it might be more effective
for veterans to compel a more comprehensive response from Con-
gress and the Department of Veterans Affairs including medical
coverage for affected spouses and children. However, since the lit-
igation process has already begun, it is necessary to examine the
likelihood of success in that forum.5"
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNiTY-A BACKGROUND
Governmental immunity has not yet become a predominant is-
sue in the current Gulf War litigation, however, it merits brief dis-
cussion because it may emerge as an integral aspect of the ulti-
mate decisions.
49 Id. § 107. The section authorizes the Secretary of the Veterans Administration to "pro-
vide for the conduct of diagnostic testing and appropriate medical examinations" for these
individuals. Id. § 107(a). The individual seeking such services must be one:
(1) who is the spouse or child of a veteran who-
(A) is listed in the Persian Gulf War Veterans Registry... and
(B) is suffering from an illness or disorder;
(2) who is apparently suffering from, or may have suffered from, an illness or disorder
(including a birth defect, miscarriage, or stillbirth) which cannot be disassociated from
the veteran's service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations; and
(3) who, in the case of a spouse, has granted the Secretary permission to include in the
Registry relevant medical data (including a medical history and the results of diagnos-
tic testing and medical examinations) and such other information as the Secretary con-
siders relevant and appropriate with respect to such individual.
Id. § 107(a)(1)-(3). This program is authorized for less than two years, beginning on Novem-
ber 1, 1994 and ending on September 30, 1996. Id. § 107(b).
50 Id. § 105. A newsletter, containing the latest information on scientific research into
Persian Gulf syndrome and on benefits available to veterans and their spouses and chil-
dren through the Department of Veterans Affairs, is to be made available to every veteran
listed on the V.A.'s registry at least twice a year. Id. § 105(b). This information will also be
made available by means of a toll-free number established by the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. Id. § 105(c).
51 See, e.g., Thomas D. Williams, Medical Claims for Gulf War Ailments Most Often De-
nied, HARTFo CouRANT, Dec. 27, 1994, at A7 (reporting that almost two-thirds of Gulf
War veterans seeking government sponsored medical treatment are denied such coverage).
52 See Coleman v. Abb Lummus Crest, Inc., No. G-94-415, (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30,
1994). For example, Gulf War veterans are seeking in excess of one billion dollars in dam-
ages for injuries they allege were caused by chemical and biological weapons. Id.5 3 1d.
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity has traditionally operated
to bar suit against the state.54 Congress relinquished much of this
federal privilege by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act.55 Nev-
ertheless, Congress retained a key element of immunity in the
military setting, as announced in Feres v. United States.56 In
Feres, the Supreme Court held that the United States government
is not liable to members of the armed forces for injuries which
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.
" 51
In precluding such litigation, the Court reasoned that certain
suits, such as those involving the military, fall outside the scope of
the Act.58 The Court cited the Veterans Administration compensa-
tion program as further support for its position,5 9 stating that the
Veterans Administration was capable of providing a fully ade-
quate means of redress for any soldier's injuries. 60 Furthermore,
in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,61 the Court
expanded the exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act by apply-
ing the Feres standard to contractors who seek indemnification
from the United States government.2 In Stencel, Captain John
Donham, a National Guardsman, was permanently injured when
a negligently designed component of his airplane malfunctioned.6 3
Donham brought suit against Stencel, the manufacturer of the
negligently designed component, and Stencel then cross-claimed
54 See, e.g., Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 598-99 (1982) (stating doctrine provides that United States cannot be
sued without consent of Congress). Effectively, the United States cannot be held liable for
damages absent a statutory waiver of the immunity. Id. at 599.
55 Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1988) (authorizing government officials to
settle claims against United States for certain acts of governmental employees and mem-
bers of Armed Forces).
56 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
57 Id. at 146. Congress, in drafting the Federal Tort Claims Act, did not create a new
cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death due to negli-
gence. Id. Feres thus created a blanket government immunity in cases of military service
tort suits on a variety of grounds, relying on the need to observe due deference to military
discipline. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litiga-
tion, 98 YALE L.J. 813, 814-15 (1989).
58 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141. The Court specifically noted that the Act did not state that all
claims must be allowed. Id.
59 Id. at 145.
60 Id. Plaintiffs in Feres availed themselves of Veterans Administration payments and
statutory compensation systems for members of the armed forces and their surviving de-
pendents, which included death gratuities. Id.
61 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
62 Id. at 673 (concluding that policies underlying Feres were applicable to bar Stencel's
suit against United States).
63 Id. at 673-74.
19951 GULF WAR SYNDROME
against the United States.64 The Supreme Court concluded that
the Feres reasoning was equally applicable to this case and that it
served to bar Stencel's third-party indemnity action against the
United States.6 5
The Feres/Stencel doctrine proved to be central in the in In re
Agent Orange settlement and other cases involving claims against
the government.6 6 Accordingly, it may emerge as a key doctrine in
the Gulf War litigation.
III. IN RE AGENT ORANG.,a. RE-DEFINING Toxic TORT LITIGATION
The United States government sprayed the herbicide Agent Or-
ange67 in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970.68 This use, however, has
been widely linked to a multitude of medical problems, ranging
64 Id. at 668.
65 Id. at 673. The Court evaluated Stencel's suit against the United States according to
two factors which were the basis for the Feres holding. Id. First, it noted the "distinctively
federal" character of the relationship between the government and members of the armed
forces. Id. at 671 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)). "[Tlhe
'distinctively federal' nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government
means that military personnel should not be subject to variations in state law when seek-
ing relief." William J. Blechman, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are
Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. Mrmvi L. REv. 489, 493
n. 17 (1982). The second factor noted by the Stencel Court was the Veterans' Benefits Act,
which provided "generous pensions to injured servicemen," thereby obviating the need for a
tort suit against the government. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671. A third factor considered by the
Court was the need for military discipline, which the Court felt could be promoted by
prohibiting military personnel from questioning the validity of orders from their superiors.
Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, (1954)). The Stencel Court reasoned that a
third-party action against the government would evoke "second-guessing of military or-
ders" and would insinuate a certain degree of fault in the same way as a direct suit against
the government would. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
66 See, e.g., Seveney v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 653, 653 (D.R.I. 1982) (barring claims
by family members of serviceman who was exposed to radiation while on active duty); Har-
rison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 356 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980) (dismissing suit of wife of serviceman under Federal Tort
Claims Act for loss of consortium due to husband's injury).
67 See YOUNG & REGGIAm, supra note 22. This herbicide was a reddish brown to tan
colored liquid formulated to contain an equal amount of n-butyl esters 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T.
Id.; see also SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 17 (1986) (stating that Agent Orange, composed of
equal parts of 2, 4-0 and 2, 4, 5-T, proved effective in defoliating woody and broad-leafed
vegetation). Agent Orange was also utilized to improve the Army's visibility and destroy
the enemy's food supply. Richard A. Roth, The Essence of the Agent Orange Litigation: The
Government Contract Defense, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv., 983, 1003 n.163 (1984) (noting that
United States sprayed herbicides over South Vietnam for strategic purpose of destroying
enemy's food supply). Other agents were sprayed in large quantities in Southeast Vietnam.
YOUNG & REGGIAN, supra at 9-28.
68 See YOUNG & REGGiANI, supra note 22, at 12. Agent Orange was, however, the most
widely used herbicide in South Vietnam. Id. at 12-13. By the end of the conflict, the U.S.
government had sprayed approximately 44,953,560 liters of Agent Orange. Id. at 13-14.
684 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:673
from skin rashes to cancer.6 9 The subsequent legal consequences
of Agent Orange use parallel the medical ones in complexity and
severity.70 After a Veterans Administration officer advanced the
idea that veterans' symptoms might be associated with Agent Or-
ange exposure, veterans filed claims and litigation ensued.7' The
plaintiffs then consolidated their pretrial proceedings in federal
District Court after successfully petitioning the federal Multi-dis-
trict Litigation Panel.72
During a lengthy pre-trial stage, District Court Judge George
Pratt of the Eastern District of New York rejected the plaintiffs'
statutory claims,73 but allowed claims based on federal common
law.7" In reversing the District Court decision, Judge Amalya
Kearse of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that federal common law was not applicable be-
cause federal interests had not been directly implicated by the liti-
69 See SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 17-18. As early as 1963, an army review of toxicity
studies of Agent Orange ingredients suggested an increased risk of severe skin condition
and respiratory irritation. Id. at 17. The contaminant tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
("TCDD"), a by-product of the manufacturing process of Agent Orange, has been recognized
as one of the most highly toxic substances ever synthesized. Id. at 18 (citing interview with
Arthur Galston, chairman, Department of Biology, Yale University); see also Murray
Polner, For Long Island Veterans, Trauma and Injuries of War Persist, N.Y. Tzms, Nov. 8,
1992, at 8. The article reported that the Veterans Administration currently recognizes four
diseases caused by exposure to Agent Orange: (1) chloracne-a skin rash; (2) soft-tissue
sarcoma-cancer of the muscles and tissues; (3) non-Hodgkin's lymphoma-a group of ill-
nesses including the growth of cancerous lymphoid cells; and (4) peripheral neuropathy-a
disease of the nervous system that gives rise to numbness and tingling.
70 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 998 (2d Cir. 1980). Several indi-
vidual veterans and their families originally filed complaints in the Eastern and Southern
Districts of New York and the Northern District of Illinois to set the Agent Orange litiga-
tion in motion. Id.
71 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 814. Judge George Pratt used the term Agent Orange to
include, collectively, the herbicides Orange, Pink, Purple and Green. In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 768 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
72 In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 768. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (providing
that "when civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any such district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings."). The consolidated case was assigned to Judge George
Pratt of the Eastern District of New York. Rabin, supra note 57, at 814-15.
73 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Plaintiffs
based these claims on the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1976). Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 740-741.
74 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 745-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Pratt
noted that the federal interest in the litigation, a factor in determining whether federal
common law should be applied, was strong here due to the increasing number of veterans
involved in the litigation and the increasing size of the claims. Id. at 747-48. He decided
that this federal interest would be unfairly burdened by the application of state law to
plaintiffs' claims because the states did not have uniform tort laws. Id. at 748. According to
Judge Pratt, the application of federal law would not significantly displace state law be-
cause "state tort law has not yet evolved to govern the duties of federal war contractors to
federal soldiers." Id. at 749.
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gation.75 In late 1980, Judge Pratt then ruled on the remaining
motions 76 and pronounced a case management plan.77 While
Judge Pratt deemed the case ready for discovery, he limited the
inquiries to the government contractor defense v.7  In addition,
Judge Pratt began to view the problem of causation as critical in
deciding other aspects of the case and accordingly, determined
that all issues should be decided together.7 9 As this discovery pro-
ceeded, 0 Judge Pratt was appointed to the Second Circuit.8 '
The subsequent appointment of Judge Jack Weinstein to the
case marked the inception of a new approach to mass toxic tort
cases arising from United States military action.8 2 Judge Wein-
stein shifted the legal focus from the government contractor de-
75 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). Focusing on
the private nature of the litigation, the Second Circuit noted that the United States was not
a party to this litigation and concluded that there was no federal interest in "uniformity for
its own sake." Id. at 993. Although the court discerned a substantive federal interest in the
content of the laws as applied to plaintiffs claims, because that federal interest had not
been articulated by Congress, it could not implicate the use of federal common law. Id. at
994-95. Since the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not find an
"identifiable" federal policy which would be threatened by the use of state law, it deter-
mined that federal common law rules did not apply. Id. at 995 (citing Wallis v. Pan Ameri-
can Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) and Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977)).
See Elliot Dobin, Note, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation: Limiting the Use
of Federal Common Law as the Basis for Federal Question Jurisdiction in Private Litiga-
tion, 48 BROOK. L. Rv. 1027, 1030 (1982). The author argues that the decision represents
the Second Circuit's reluctance to sustain federal question jurisdiction based on federal
common law in private litigation and its refusal to expand existing federal common law
doctrine in the absence of distinct congressional policy. Id.
76 In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 762. Relying on the Feres/Stencel doctrine, Judge
Pratt dismissed all pending cross-claims against the United States government. Id. at 774.
He held that the government contractor defense might be applicable, but that the chemical
companies must prove certain facts concerning their relationship with the United States
government and their performance under the military contract for the production of Agent
Orange. Id. at 794-96.
77 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 782-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The
management plan consisted of four major components: certification of the litigation as a
class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); a survey of applicable state statutes of
limitations; separate trials of factual issues common to the class; and commencement of
limited discovery to be conducted in phases. Id.
78 In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 797-99 (allowing discovery only by written inter-
rogatories directed at government contract defense).
79 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (deter-
mining that it was no longer appropriate to conduct separate trials to determine open is-
sues such as causation and applicability of government contractor defense).
80 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 815. The author stated that Judge Pratt worked at an
inconstant pace to achieve pre-trial order for a controversy which posed daunting issues
such as class certification, statute of limitations, choice of laws, causation, governmental
immunity and government contractor status. Id.
81 Id.
82 Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267, 1273 (1987) (citing
ScHuCK, supra note 27, at 112). Marcus claims that by summoning all lawyers to his cham-
bers in an imposing fashion in October 1983, Judge Weinstein "turned the Agent Orange
case around." Id.
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fense to causation, thereby changing the character of the case.13
His efforts plainly entailed an effort to exert pressure on all par-
ties8 4 through the use of judicial ingenuity. 5 Judge Weinstein's
approach culminated in the one of the most controversial settle-
ments in tort history.86 While it is debatable whether the settle-
ment actually benefited the recipients to any measurable degree,,"
it is evident that it serves as one of the most visible guideposts for
military tort litigation. 8
83 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 815 (noting that Judge Weinstein discerned national con-
sensus law).
84 Id. at 815-17. Judge Weinstein aimed his creativity and domineering character at all
the parties during the pre-trial stage:
When the Army insisted on its military command immunity under the Feres doctrine,
he devised an independent theory of government liability to aggrieved spouses and
after-born children. When the plaintiffs' lawyers evinced a determination to go to trial,
he opined that their case on causation might not survive summary judgment. At the
same time, when the chemical companies showed signs of stonewalling, he raised the
specter of crippled and maimed veterans appearing before a sympathetic jury.
Id. at 815-16; see also Arnold H. Lubasch, Jack Weinstein: Creative U.S. Judge Who Dis-
dains Robe and High Bench, N.Y. T mEs, May 28, 1991, at B5. While most lawyers ac-
knowledge Judge Weinstein as being one of the most innovative judges in the Federal judi-
ciary, some characterize him as being an impatient judge who sometimes pressures
attorneys to settle complex litigation. Id.
85 Rabin, supra note 57, at 815. Although the Second Circuit had previously held that
federal common law was inapplicable to plaintiffs' claims, Judge Weinstein nevertheless
developed a "national consensus law" among all the states, which would result at trial in
the application of one set of tort law to the case. Id. While introducing a "representative"
test case approach, Judge Weinstein developed a strategy for providing veterans with no-
tice and enunciated an opt-out alternative for recalcitrant claimants. Id.
86 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Cmi. L. REv. 337, 343 (1986). The parties reached a settlement on May 7,
1984, the day jury selection was scheduled to begin. Id. According to Professor Schuck, the
goal of settling was foremost in Judge Weinstein's mind from outset because "toxic tort
cases like Agent Orange, involving mass exposures and causal relationships that are ex-
tremely difficult and costly to prove, could not be litigated properly or at an acceptable
social cost under traditional rules." Id. at 343. He further contends that a settlement ap-
peared to be the most attractive arrangement because both sides would benefit at a socially
acceptable cost. Id; see also Rabin, supra note 57, at 816. Judge Weinstein attempted to
pursue this settlement on terms he considered equitable to both sides. Id. The final settle-
ment was for $180 million. Id.
87 See ScHucK, supra note 27, at 217-220; see also Payments for Families of Defoliant's
Victims, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 3, 1989, at A23. In March of 1989 the Agent Orange settlement
fund distributed its first payments, averaging $3,000 each, to families of Vietnam veterans
whose deaths were linked to the defoliant. Id.
88 See SciiucK, supra note 27, at 171. While $180 million constituted the largest settle-
ment of any personal injury case to that date, the veterans believed that this figure was a
small fraction of what a jury would have awarded them and an even smaller fraction of the
chemical companies' profits earned at the veterans' expense. Id.
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IV. A COMPARISON OF AGENT ORANGE AND GULF WAR
SYNDROME
The filing of the complaint in federal court in Texas by Desert
Storm veterans alleging negligence by certain chemical compa-
nies89 seems reminiscent of In re Agent Orange. It again raises
various issues concerning the adequacy of the tort system to ad-
dress the needs of the aggrieved parties and generates proposals
for amending the current system.90
A. Tort System Criticism After Agent Orange
Following the In re Agent Orange settlement, several legal
scholars questioned whether the tort system was equipped to meet
its goals of compensation and deterrence9' in the face of a mass
toxics disaster.92 The general consensus was that the tort system
was ill-equipped to deal with the Agent Orange suit due to its
heavy reliance on causation and its demand for sufficient evidence
to establish a causal link.93 Furthermore, proving a causal connec-
tion, such as the one between dioxin and the symptoms exhibited
89 See Coleman v. Abb Lummus Crest, Inc., No. G-94-415 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30, 1994).
The chemical companies named in the litigation are Abb Lummus Crest Inc. of Bloomfield,
NJ, Abb Lummus Crest North America Inc. of DE, Alcolac Inc. of GA, Alcolac International
of Linthicum, MD, Interchem Inc. of Monmouth Junction, NJ, Rhone-Poulenc Posi-Seal
International Inc. of DE, Fisher Controls International Inc. of St. Louis, Bechtel Group Inc.
of San Francisco, and Bechtel Corp. and American Type Culture Collection Inc. of Rock-
ville, MD. Id. Twenty-six veterans filed the $1 billion class action lawsuit against these
companies alleging that the firms made biological compounds they knew were "unreasona-
bly dangerous" and that the firms conducted business in such a way that allowed "an out-
law country like Iraq" to acquire the compounds and use them to make weapons. Id. at 33-
35.
90 See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (outlining inadequacies of tort system in
dealing with mass toxics).
91 See SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 277-97 (acknowledging three broad policy goals of tort
system concerning mass torts: compensation, deterrence and constraint on both); see also
Rabin, supra note 57, at 817-22. (pointing to compensation and vindication of victims' inju-
ries, deterrence of accident generating conduct, and tolerable level of administrative costs
as goals of tort system).
92 See Rabin, supra note 57 at 819 (noting that after five years of pre-trial activity,
number of seriously disabled claimants in class, character, and extent of their injuries was
still unclear). Under the circumstances, the $180 million settlement did not reflect the
probability of success if the tort claims had been litigated and, furthermore, did not approx-
imate any rational estimate of economic or intangible loss actually suffered by the claim-
ants. Id.
93 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 269
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Generally, the plaintiff must introduce
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for concluding that it is more likely than not that
the particular conduct of the defendant was the cause in fact of the alleged injuries. Id.
688 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:673
by Vietnam veterans, 94 requires the establishment of a causal
chain9 5 and an explanation of the vital role of the given agent.9 6
Concerning toxics, this process often requires the use of expert
testimony. 97 Ironically, this is the type of testimony that led Judge
Weinstein to conclude that plaintiffs in Agent Orange may not
have had enough evidence to survive the scrutiny of summary
judgment.98 While it would be naive to assert that all toxic tort
cases present insurmountable causation problems, cases such as
In re Agent Orange illuminate the difficulties surrounding the
proof required in the tort system.
94 See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227 (1987) (arguing
that there are two causation problems in considering compensation). Professor Farber first
cites to the problem in establishing that the chemical involved is capable of causing the
type of harm from which the plaintiff suffers. Id. He then explains that the other problem
involving proof of causation is establishing, once it is proven that the toxic substance in
question can cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff's harm did result
from the alleged, particular exposure. Id.
95 See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of the Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Benedictin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv., 643, 644 n.7 (1992) (citing H.L.A. HART & ANTHONY HONORx, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(2d ed. 1985)); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735,
1737 (1985) (discussing scope and significance of causation in tort law context of causal
inquiry and problems associated with causation). The author notes that the causation re-
quirement, which relieves a defendant of liability if it cannot be established, is the more
pervasive yet elusive concept in tort law. Id. at 1737.
96 See Green, supra note 95, at 644.
97 See generally Green, supra note 95, at 644 n.6 (noting many courts have restricted
admissibility of expert witness testimony). The author also describes five different types of
evidence which can contribute to an inference of causation: epidemiology, animal toxicol-
ogy, in vitro testing, chemical structural analysis, and case reports. Id. at 644-58. Green
utilized the Agent Orange and Benedictin litigation as examples of judicial approaches to
admitting expert testimony, both involving the burden of production on cause in fact. Id at
659-63. One approach, effectively adopted by Judge Weinstein, requires epidemiologic
studies by the plaintiff showing a causal connection between the agent and the illness. Id.
at 659-60 n.72 (citing In Re Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). An-
other approach, espoused by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984), does not require
epidemiologic evidence for a plaintiff to meet the burden of production on cause in fact.
Green, supra at 663. This treatment has been deemed to be "passive acceptance of scientific
testimony," allowing the jury to make a determination when expert testimony conflicts con-
cerning certain undecided scientific fields. Id.
98 See Arvin Maskin, A Legal Assessment of the Agent Orange Controversy, in YOUNG &
REGGIAN, supra note 22, at 175-78 (noting that United States limited its motion for sum-
mary judgment to claims arising from miscarriages and birth defects). Maskin stresses
certain weaknesses in plaintiffs available epidemiological evidence. Id. at 175. Plaintiffs
did not introduce any biochemical or laboratory tests or other non-epidemiological means
by which birth defects or miscarriages could be attributed to parental exposure. Id. The
author notes that plaintiffs "did not dispute the fact that no epidemiological evidence sub-
stantiated or even corroborated" their contentions. Id. at 177-78; see also Farber, supra
note 94, at 1234-35 (stating that weakness of plaintiffs' causation evidence persuaded
Judge Weinstein to approve $180 million settlement).
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B. The Question of Causation
Litigation based on Gulf War Syndrome is likely to present an
even more attenuated causal connection than that which existed
in the Agent Orange litigation. Due to the assortment of symp-
toms exhibited by Desert Storm veterans, 99 experts suspect that
there may be multiple causes for Gulf War Syndrome. 100 A 1994
report issued by the National Institutes of Health found that Gulf
War Syndrome involves symptoms that could have been caused by
biological and chemical warfare agents, vaccines, parasites, or a
combination of these factors. 101 The lack of meaningful data on
the veterans' illnesses, however, prevented the workshop from es-
tablishing a case definition.'0 2 The absence of this data also pre-
cluded identification of any single explanation for Gulf War
Syndrome.1 0
3
99 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. S1196-201 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
In his statement to the Senate, Senator Riegle alleged that symptoms associated with Gulf
War syndrome have already killed returning veterans and that other symptoms including
serious memory loss, intestinal and heart problems, runny noses, urinary and intestinal
tract problems, twitching, sores, as well as emotional and temper problems, had been re-
ported. Patrick Cockburn, U.S. Troops Claim Gulf "Disease", THE INDEPENDENT (London),
June 10, 1993, at 14. According to Major-General Ronald R. Blanck, commanding officer at
the Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, veterans are suffering from "malaise/fatigue, mus-
cle/joint pain, intermittent fever, diarrhea, abdominal pain, thick saliva, thinning/loss of
hair, weight loss, skin rash, and bleeding gums." Id; see also No Kuwait Oil Fire Link
Found to GI Ills, CHI. Tam., Sept. 17, 1992, at 6. Veterans' complaints have also included
bleeding gums, elevated blood pressure, and liver disorders.
100 See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP STATE-
MENT: THE PERSIAN GULF EXPERIENCE AND HEALTH, Apr. 27-29, 1994 [hereinafter NIH RE-
PORT]. One of the conclusions of the workshop panel was that "[n]o single disease or syn-
drome is apparent, but rather there are multiple illnesses with overlapping symptoms and
causes." Id. at 18. The report divides the illnesses suffered by Gulf War veterans into those
which were expected and those which were unexpected. Id. at 4. "Certain infectious dis-
eases, such as acute viral, bacterial, and parasitic respiratory and gastrointestinal infec-
tions due to crowded living conditions" were expected to be reported by Gulf War veterans
and were not the subject the workshop's study. Id. Instead the workshop focused on the
incidence of unexpected illnesses, which are defined as "previously unrecognized and unan-
ticipated symptom complexes or illnesses that do not fit traditional diagnostic categories."
Id. The data presented to the workshop was insufficient to determine whether the inci-
dence of unexpected illnesses in Gulf War veterans was higher significantly than in the
general population. Id. The data did suggest, however, that "deployed active-duty person-
nel and deployed reservists reported more symptoms than did their non-deployed counter-
parts." Id.
101 See N.I.H. REPORT, supra note 100, at 3-6; see also John Toth, Ill Veterans File Law-
suit Over "Gulf War Syndrome", Hous. CHRON., June 8, 1994, at 22 (quoting report which
concludes that "[tihere is no single disease or syndrome apparent, but rather multiple ill-
nesses with overlapping symptoms and causes").
102 See N.I.H. REPORT, supra note 100, at 18.
103 See N.I.H. REPORT, supra note 100, at 7. The report does, however, examine possible
causative or contributing factors to the unexplained symptoms, including leishmaniasis,
exposure to petroleum vapors, sand dust, depleted uranium, pyridostigmine, pesticides,
690 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:673
The plaintiffs who filed suit in United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas1 0 4 must overcome several signifi-
cant hurdles in proving causation.105 They intend to show that
"they were repeatedly exposed to chemical and/or biological re-
agents" and that these exposures caused their illnesses. 10 6 The
Agent Orange cases never specifically addressed the causation is-
sue in a litigation context because of the settlement.10 7 However,
Judge Weinstein's treatment of the claimants who "opted-out" of
the class action,10 8 by granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment, indicates that the burden may be insurmountable in
similar cases. " Relying on Ferebee v. Chevron Chemicai Corp. ,:
Judge Weinstein stated that under either strict liability or negli-
chemical agent coatings used on vehicles and equipment, exposure to biological and chemi-
cal warfare vaccines, and stressors. Id. at 7-14.
104 See Coleman v. Abb Lummus Crest, Inc., No. G-94-415 (S.D. Texas filed Sept. 30,
1994).
105 See HART & HoNoRE, supra note 95, at 152. A negligent act is unintentional but not
accidental, for such act would reasonably be expected, in the circumstances, to lead to
harm. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). The Restatement
provides:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving
the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in
the harm.
Id.; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 93, § 42, at 279 (illustrating problems to be
considered as approach to proximate cause).
106 Coleman v. Abb Lummus Crest, Inc., No. G-94-415, at 32 (S.D. Texas filed Sept. 30,
1994). Plaintiffs allege multiple theories of liability, including strict liability, failure to
warn, negligence per se and gross negligence. Id. at 33-34.
107 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1989) (approving settlement due to
difficult causation problems faced by plaintiffs, uncertainties and unacceptable burdens on
both sides' legal representatives).
108 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dis-
missing suits of claimants who opted not to participate in settlement). Judge Weinstein
determined that "no acceptable study to date of Vietnam veterans and their families [has]
concluded that there is a causal connection between exposure to Agent Orange and the
serious adverse health effects claimed by plaintiffs." Id. at 1231. The judge also held that
the plaintiffs experts' evidence on causation was inadmissible and worthless. Id. at 1238-
39. Therefore, the judge concluded that plaintiffs were unable to establish that a material
issue of fact existed with respect to causation. Id. at 1260.
109 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (requiring lack of existence of genuine issue of material fact in
order to grant summary judgment); see also Arvin Maskin, A Legal Assessment of the Agent
Orange Controversy, in YOUNG & REGGLa I, supra note 22, at 174-75. Maskin points out
that establishing one's entitlement to relief is not "summary" in terms of quality of proof
required when the motion is predicated on causation. Id. But see SCHUCK, supra note 27, at
226-27 (noting that general rule is any doubts must be resolved against summary judg-
ment largely because of plaintiffs' constitutional right to have jury decide all material fac-
tual issues).
110 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). The court concluded
that cases with complex causal issues, where there is dissention among experts as to a link
between low level toxic chemical and human disease, require a jury decision. Id. at 1535.
1995] GULF WAR SYNDROME
gence, plaintiffs would have to prove a "but-for" causal connection
between their claimed injuries and their exposure to Agent Or-
ange by a preponderance of the evidence. 11' In Ferebee, the Court
of Appeals reversed a summary judgment decision against an ag-
ricultural worker who claimed that his pulmonary fibrosis re-
sulted from long term exposure to paraquat. 112 Judge Weinstein
swiftly distinguished Agent Orange from Ferebee,113 noting that
Ferebee did not require epidemiologic studies because the plaintiff
supplied technically competent and probative evidence from phy-
sicians that the paraquat led to his death.1
14
Due to the factual similarities that underlie both cases, Agent
Orange and Gulf War Syndrome, it is likely that Gulf War Syn-
drome cases will refer to Weinstein's In re Agent Orange opinions
for guidance. In applying the opt-out causation standard to the
present Desert Storm case, it becomes apparent that the overlap-
ping symptoms and causes, coupled with uncertainty in the medi-
cal and scientific communities, could present grounds for dismis-
sal. Since there is uncertainty in the scientific and medical
communities surrounding the cause or causes of Gulf War Syn-
drome,1 1 5 application of a Judge Weinstein analysis from Ferebee
would demand epidemiologic studies from the plaintiffs showing
the requisite causal connection.116
111 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1261. Although Judge Weinstein applied a rigor-
ous standard for overcoming the summary judgment motion made by the opt-out plaintiffs,
he deftly expanded the settlement to include all completely disabled veterans able to estab-
lish any exposure to Agent Orange, effectively removing the causation element from the
settlement. Id.; see also Rabin, supra note 57, at 823. See generally PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 93, at 269 (discussing preponderance of evidence standard of proof in negligence
cases).
112 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532. The court decided that sufficient evidence of causation had
been demonstrated to justify submission of the issue to the jury. Id. Furthermore, the court
held that the manufacturer had sufficient knowledge to warrant a more detailed label, and
that evidence supported the jury's finding that inadequate labeling was the proximate
cause of the worker's illness. Id.
113 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that "Agent
Orange presents entirely different set of problems" than Ferebee).
114 Id. at 1261-62. (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)). Judge Weinstein also differentiated the cases by com-
paring the long period of time during which the agricultural worker had been exposed to
paraquat, while the Vietnam veterans' exposure to Agent Orange had been for much
shorter amounts of time. Id. at 1262. The court also stated that in the "Agent Orange"
litigation no competent particularistic evidence was presented and furthermore, the rele-
vant epidemiological evidence was negative. Id.
115 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing possible causes of Gulf War
Syndrome).
116 See In re Agent Orange 611 F. Supp. at 1261-62. Judge Weinstein interpreted Fer-
ebee to require that in the absence of "technically competent, probative evidence [by an
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C. The Costs of Litigation
In deciding the summary judgment motion against the opt-out
claimants, and essentially reinforcing the futility of the Agent Or-
ange claims, Judge Weinstein observed that both the government
and other groups had spent millions of dollars in research during
the almost six years of In re Agent Orange Product Liability Liti-
gation.'17 While the settlement provided for the establishment of
a $180 million fund, experts estimate that administrative costs
had reached approximately $110 million by 1984.118 This assess-
rtiiu~uju 4~iib tvL wiiuL11i Lair, L'L bDybLViu, WiLal 1XVbdIJIV
administrative costs, is generally a cost effective means of seeking
redress. 119 More specifically, it adds credence to the primary argu-
ment that the tort system, with causation as an integral compo-
nent, is unable to process mass toxic cases effectively. 120
expert] that the chemical in question led to [the injury]," epidemiological proof was neces-
sary. Id.
117 Id. at 1260 (stating years of discovery and tens of millions of dollars spent on re-
search has not produced any competent evidence indicating any issues of fact regarding
causation).
118 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 820 (enumerating terms of settlement specifically ac-
counting for $180 million plus interest). By May of 1984, plaintiffs had spent over $10 mil-
lion dollars and defendants had spent roughly $100 million dollars in an extensive trial
preparation effort. Id. at 820 n.20. The author states that the defendants had major incen-
tives in prolonging the litigation, and consequently increasing the costs to the plaintiffs, in
the hopes that the plaintiffs' resources would become insufficient. Id. at 821.
119 See John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolu-
tion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1989) (book review) (stating tort system is poor mecha-
nism for providing compensation because it provides less than 50 cents on dollar for every
dollar of cost). Donohue recognizes the benefits of using insurance to provide compensation
rather than the tort system. Id. at 1048. Private insurance provides benefits exceeding
eighty cents per dollar of cost. Id; see also Rabin, supra note 57, at 821 (citing JAMES
KAKALIK & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION XVII-XIX(1986), noting that even classic two-party negligence case is costly mechanism for allocat-
ing losses, as compared to no-fault and social insurance schemes). Rabin also expresses
criticism of the tort system by noting that "when process costs become the dominant char-
acteristic of a system designed to allocate liability on corrective justice principles, tort law
has lost its bearings." Id. at 829. But see Donohue, supra, at 1048 n.9 (acknowledging net
compensation of total cost is slightly higher where tort system influences defendants to
settle prior to litigation).
120 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 978 (1993) (noting that many supporters of tort
system would agree that traditional two-party system is inadequate for handling mass
toxic tort cases); see also, Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1153, 1156 (1989); Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 656-58 (1990)(reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIALrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988)).
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V. ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVES
Legal scholars have openly criticized the current tort system
and have offered alternative methods of redress. 121 For example,
Professor David Rosenberg of Harvard University School of Law
has outlined a public tort model.122 In this model, he advances a
theory of proportional liability based on the percentage of injuries
attributable to defendant's activity. 123 Comparatively, Professor
Robert Rabin of Yale Law School focuses on the social insurance
model.' 24 By merely requiring proof of present injury, social insur-
ance essentially reduces plaintiff's causation burden.125
While both of these theories are noble propositions, it is ques-
tionable whether they can meet the needs of veterans more effec-
tively. Former United States Assistant Attorney General Richard
Willard maintains that the current tort system warrants proce-
dural reforms. 126 According to Willard, the tort system swayed
from its goals of compensation and deterrence, and instead, im-
poses concepts of societal insurance and risk spreading. 127 Unlike
Professors Rosenberg and Rabin, Willard believes that changing
121 See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing negative aspects of tort
claims in judicial process).
122 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv., 851, 854-55 (1984) (noting inability of
tort system to deal effectively with mass exposure cases because of plaintiffs' causation
burden concerning preponderance of evidence standard). Professor Rosenberg proposes re-
placing the preponderance of the evidence rule with a standard of proportional liability. Id.
at 859. In imposing proportional liability, the court would apportion liability and distribute
compensation in proportion to the probability of causation assigned to the excess disease
risk in the exposed population. Id; see also Schuck, supra note 27, at 268. Additionally, the
public law approach would exclusively employ a class action approach to litigation, as op-
posed to individualized claims. Id.
123 Id. at 859.
124 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 825-29. The author finds little hope for translating the
public law model from theory to practice. Id. at 825. He alternatively suggests a solution
outside the tort system. Id. Consequently, the social insurance model seems to put the
causal nexus prerequisite to rest. Id. at 827. The distinguishing characteristic of the social
insurance model is that the sole requirement for compensation by the claimant is proof of a
present disability, and therefore, proof of the cause of the disability is irrelevant. Id. Profes-
sor Rabin, however, acknowledges that a social insurance system, standing alone, would
not achieve the goal of "optimal accident prevention", one of the redeeming features of the
traditional tort system. Id. at 828. This results because the incentive to control against
undue risk is removed by the no fault, limited liability approach embodied by the social
insurance system. Id. Replacing the tort system would require the addition of a regulatory
system to control against undue risks produced by the industrial and service sectors of the
economy. Id.
125 Id. at 826.
126 See Richard K. Willard, The Litigation Explosion and the Need for Tort Reform in
THE LEGAL SYSTEM, ASSAULT ON THE ECONOMY I (Philip D. Mink ed. 1986).
127 Id. at 6-7 (arguing that courts have central tort concepts of compensation and
deterrence).
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the substantive legal doctrine through alternative claims compen-
sation systems would prove ineffective. 12 Willard contends that
these systems would not obviate the unfairness and perverse in-
centives of expansive tort liability. 129 Moreover Willard, main-
tains that alternative claims compensation systems would also in-
volve substantial transactional costs. 13
0
Close examination of the current measures being taken by Con-
gress and the Department of Veterans Affairs reveals the adoption
of a scheme that approximates the approach articulated in the so-
cial insurance model. 131 In particular, these measures unilaterally
compensate claimants who are suffering from undiagnosed ill-
nesses. 132 In the Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994,133
Congress created a legislative presumption that Gulf War veter-
ans suffering from undiagnosed illnesses contracted those ill-
nesses as a result of their service in the Gulf War. 3 4 This ap-
proach essentially circumvents the causation obstacle present in
both the traditional tort system and the public tort model. 135 The
legislation does not, however, provide compensation for veterans'
children who may be disabled by Gulf War Syndrome. 3 6 For these
individuals, one alternative is tort litigation. 137 Although the like-
128 See id. (cautioning against adopting alternative claims compensation systems involv-
ing trade-offs between levels of compensation and standards of liability). Willard notes that
alternative compensation schemes limit or preclude recovery for non-economic damages.
Id. at 7. He argues that the first step toward efficiency would be to reduce delay and legal
costs. Id. at 7.
129 Id. Willard asserts that the systems would exacerbate those effects to the extent that
they lessen the requirements for proving causation and fault. Id.
130 Richard K_ Willard, The Litigation Explosion and the Need for Tort Reform in Tim
LEGAL SYSTEM, ASSAULT ON THE ECONOMY, 35 (Philip D. Mink, ed. 1986). According to Wil-
lard, the alternative claims compensation systems would still have substantial, albeit
lower, transaction costs. Id. Also, the total cost of an alternative claims compensation pro-
gram could be enormous, even though damage levels are limited. Id.
131 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining that social insurance model
does not require proof of causation for victim compensation).
132 See Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, § 106, 108 Stat. 4645, 4650-51
(1994) (authorizing compensation for Gulf veterans suffering from undiagnosed illnesses).
133 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (detailing possible causes of Gulf War
Syndrome).
134 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (noting legislative presumption cre-
ated by Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 1994).
135 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (addressing causation obstacle posed
in mass tort litigation).
136 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (explaining alleged effects of Gulf War
syndrome on veterans' wives and children).
137 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 245-48 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (dismissing veterans' children's claims against United States for failure to present
sufficient proof of causation).
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lihood of success based on such claims is remote, 13  the suits
would, arguably, still serve the function of deterring high risk con-
duct in the toxics industry. 13 9 In addition, the financial cost of
such litigation, combined with the remote likelihood of success in
obtaining a favorable judgment, weigh heavily against this alter-
native. Thus, the intricacies and limitations of the tort system,
when dealing with mass toxics in a military context, demonstrate
that plaintiffs should pursue other options.
A. Proposal
Perhaps the most efficient and feasible option available to po-
tential claimants is the creation of a comprehensive treatment
plan for Gulf War veterans, their spouses, and children who suffer
from Gulf War syndrome.' 4 0 The implementation of such a broad
plan would require Congress to amend the 1994 Act to include
spouses' children who apparently suffer from Gulf War syn-
drome.141 This change would presumably allow spouses and chil-
dren to receive care for their illnesses on a presumptive basis
under the Act. This care would be authorized unless scientific evi-
dence conclusively establishes that the affected parties' injuries
were not caused by service in the Gulf War. By eliminating the
need for complex, costly tort litigation and recognizing the inter-
ests of these additional affected parties, the effectuation of this
plan would serve both fiscal and policy interests.
142
B. Regulatory Scheme
Exclusive reliance on this plan could prove problematic. The
plan may fail to deter high risk conduct because it offers no finan-
cial impetus for manufacturers to refrain from manufacturing
138 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of success in tort
litigation due to causation requirement).
139 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that litigation costs serve to deter
high risk conduct in toxics industry).
140 See Persian Gulf War Veterans' Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 107, 108 Stat.
4645, 4652 (1994) (authorizing study of veterans' spouses and children suffering from ill-
nesses or disorders).
141 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (explaining alleged effects of Gulf War
syndrome on veterans' wives and children).
142 See Laurie Wilson, Gulf War Veterans Form Coalition; Group Seeks Benefits for
Health Problems, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Mar. 12, 1995, at 35A. Gulf War veterans are
forming a coalition in order to compel a more comprehensive system of benefits from the
government. Id.
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dangerous products.143 Tort litigation achieves this goal through
the threat of costly litigation and even costlier judgments against
manufacturers.14 4 This positive attribute of tort litigation could,
however, be achieved through a more strictly enforced regulatory
framework. 145 Stricter regulation of exports of military value and
toxic substances must be implemented along with the expansion
of coverage of the 1994 Benefits Act in order to create a justifiable
alternative to the tort system.
1 46
V. CONCLUSION
The United States government waited more than fifteen years
to acknowledge that its use of the herbicide Agent Orange affected
over 2.5 million Vietnam veterans, their spouses and their chil-
dren. In effect, the government presumed that the veterans'
claims for compensation were invalid, leaving the wounded ser-
vicemen with the opportunity to seek redress only from the chemi-
cal companies that manufactured the herbicide. The ensuing set-
tlement revealed the inadequacy of the tort system as a vehicle for
compensating the veterans for their injuries. While Gulf War
Syndrome now stands to affect a significantly smaller number of
veterans, the problems faced by the two groups of veterans are
disturbingly similar. The compensation scheme recently adopted
by Congress is a laudable first step in avoiding the same mistakes
made with the Agent Orange veterans. It is, however, unjustifi-
ably incomplete without an expanded regulatory scheme to govern
the export of potentially harmful substances and an extension of
medical coverage to affected spouses and children of service
people.
Joseph M. Guzzardo & Jennifer L. Monachino
143 See GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 95-129 (1970); see also supra note
139 and accompanying text (noting that accident deterrence is one goal of tort system).
144 See generally Rabin, supra note 57, at 819 (explaining that plaintiff compensation
and deterrence of manufacturers' high-risk conduct are "two sides of the same coin").
145 See Rabin, supra note 57, at 828 (explaining that strictly enforced regulatory scheme
is necessary, in absence of tort system, to control against unwarranted risk in industrial
sector of economy).
146 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Westreich, Comment, Regulatory Controls on United States
Exports of Weapons and Weapons Technology: The Failure to Enforce the Arms Export Con-
trol Act, 7 ADMI. L.J. AM. U. 463,503 (1993) (proposing stricter regulation of weapons and
weapons technology exports).
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